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1 In  their  book  Capitalist  Diversity  on  Europe’s  Periphery,  Dorothee  Bohle  and  Béla
Greskovits draw attention to the specificity of Slovenia’s socio-economic development
in  (post-socialist)  transition.1 Comparing degrees  of  privatisation,  compensation for
social costs, and the influence of organised labour on policymaking, they propose three
types of capitalism: a neoliberal type in the Baltic states, an embedded neoliberal type in
the Visegrád countries (plus Croatia), and a neocorporatist type in Slovenia. 
2 The system of tripartite negotiations between trade unions, business organisations and
the state, the authors believe, was capable of determining socio-economic development
quite  independently  of  external  pressures  in  the  aftermath of  Slovenia’s  departure
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from the Yugoslav Federation (in 1991). While trade unions in Croatia, Bulgaria and
Romania also showed high mobilisation capacity and managed to form tripartite bodies
in the early 1990s, it  was only the Slovenian “social partners” that turned it  into a
permanent negotiating institution. This system of coordination led to stable economic
results for over a decade and considerably balanced the social development by relying
on internal forces and the legacy of workers’ self-management. Bohle and Greskovits
stress  that  “the  Yugoslav  legacy  of  workers’  self-management  added  a  level  of
participatory decision making unknown in other East Central European countries, and
developed it  into a system of negotiated industrial relations”2 – the “neocorporatist
model”.
3 According to Lucio Baccaro and Chris Howell,3 similar forms of collective bargaining
were also in use in certain Western European countries like Italy, Sweden and Ireland,
to  control  troubles  while  generating  social  change.  However,  notwithstanding  the
different context and scenario in each of these countries, such social changes led to a
crisis of political “representation” while, in the long run, the concessions made by the
trade  unions  more  or  less  eroded  labour  rights:  collective  agreements  were
increasingly minimalistic; the number of derogations from general agreements rose;
and trade union membership continued to  shrink as  did  the  number of  employees
under  a  collective  agreement.  Baccaro  and Howell  interpret  these  processes  as  the
result of a long-term convergence of industrial relations in the neoliberal direction.
Indeed, the Chicago economic school (including Milton Friedman and Gary Becker) and
historical promoters of the free market and neoliberal order were opposed to what
they  called  the  “privileged  protections”  given  to  trade  unions.  They  claimed  that
protections distorted a “well-functioning labour market,” and that the higher wages
received by trade union members increase unemployment and lower wages in non-
unionised sectors. 
4 The  transformation  of  labour/capital  relations  has  entailed  multiple  dimensions  in
Slovenia.  This  article  does  not  aim  to  analyse  them  all,  but  to shed  light  on  how
Slovenian  trade  unions'  strategies  and  membership  have  evolved  since  the  end  of
socialism, with a specific interest in the stratification of workers.  This is  consistent
with  both  historical  and  recent  research  on  divisions  within  the  “working  class”
recognising that, to paraphrase Emmanuel Terray, all proletarians are wage workers (in
a legal sense), yet not all wage workers are proletarians.4 Eric Hobsbawm’s historical
research showed the socio-economic cleavages of the working class,  with a division
between the labour aristocracy and the labouring poor.5 The term labour aristocracy, in
Hobsbawm’s usage, refers to two crucial historical controversies. The first, from the
nineteenth century,  concerned trade  unions  made up of  a  small  stratum of  skilled
workers, artisans and middlemen who enjoyed much better working conditions and
(directly or indirectly) benefited from co-exploiting the labouring poor. By defending
their privileges, these trade unions came into conflict with the general trade unions
fighting for the rights of unskilled workers. The second controversy drew on the old
(post-1917)  Marxist  critique  that  the  “labour  aristocracy”  is  responsible  for  the
reformism  of  unionism  and  of  certain  political  (socio-democratic)  parties.6 In  the
twentieth  century,  debates  on  the  existence  of  a  labour  aristocracy  and  the
stratification of workers continued. Research into the contemporary working class in
the 1970s and 1980s revolved around the term petty bourgeoisie. While some authors,
like  Nicos  Poulantzas,  related  it  to  unproductive  labour  (as  opposed  to  productive
labour),7 others related it to the “superiors” who receive a share of the surplus value
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that capital extracts from workers.8 Recent research by Duménil and Lévy looks at a
particular group of wage workers – management – as a new social class that extracts
surplus labour from workers by means of wage inequalities.9 Despite differences in the
authors’  perspectives and their concepts,  they all  point to unequal relations among
various groups of wage workers. 
5 Most of these authors analyse the political orientation of the groups they identify. The
analyses  by  Baudelot,  Establet  and  Malemort10 help  in  understanding  the  different
(even  contradictory)  political  effects  produced  by  the  petty  bourgeoisie  in  various
stages  of  capitalist  development.  However,  our  research  goes  beyond  the  political
consciousness of one specific social group by questioning the articulation of the various
“political positions” held by groups within the working class. With this aim in mind, we
analyse different expectations of workers in the workplace and within trade unions
using the concept of the “technical” and “political” composition of the labour force.
These two notions were developed by the Italian Operaismo from the Marxist concepts
of  the  organic  composition  of  capital, its  technical  and  value  composition.11 The
technical  composition  of  the  labour  force  is  understood  as  a  particular  division  of
labour  in  the  labour  process,  and of  the  separation  of  execution from control  and
planning.  As  such,  it  determines  the  conditions  for  the  labour  force’s  political
articulations, including the differences (conflicting interests, tensions) among groups
of wage workers. Still,  the political composition is also influenced by many external
factors; namely, political, social, historical and cultural.12
6 Adopting the concepts  developed by Operaismo and relying on our  case  study,  the
article focuses on the relationship between a trade union and its membership, trade
unions’  strategies  and the composition of  trade union membership,  as  well  as  how
workers  perceive  trade  union  activities.  We  ask  who  are  trade  union  members:
privileged  core  workers,  the  labour  aristocracy  or  unskilled  workers?  Who are  the
biggest supporters of trade unions? What do they expect in return for their support?
Which differences exist among various groups of workers, between unionised and non-
unionised workers? How are these groups connected to trade union strategies?
7 The first section of the article analyses the evolution of Slovenian trade unions from
the socialist period to the present, highlighting three major strategies. After stressing
the main features of trade unions during the self-management system, trade unions are
shown to have evolved from a “social partnership” to “class-based unionism” and then
to “economic unionism.” The article then proceeds to a case study where in the second
section  of  the  article  the  stratifications  among  workers  (expressing  the  “technical
composition of labour”) in three large companies where we conducted the research are
examined. In the third section, we approach the political composition of workers as
reflected  in  trade  union  membership  and  workers’  expectations  of  trade  unions.
Finally, in the conclusion, we comment on the main results,  the limits and possible
further development of our research.
8 The case study builds  on data collected in the framework of  a  research project  we
carried out in 2013 and 2014.  It  allows a glimpse behind the factory walls  of  three
Slovenian  companies:13 a  state-owned  paper  company, 14 a  publishing  company  in
domestic  private  ownership,  and  a  printing  company  owned  by  a  multinational
company.  The  research  was  commissioned  by  a  confederation  of  trade  unions
established in the early 1990s after a split from the Association of Free Trade Unions of
Slovenia (ZSSS). The confederation selected companies in which it was active. Although
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we  had  no  say  in  this  selection  of  the  cases,  one  positive  aspect  was  that  the
confederation  organised  full  access  to  the  company  premises  for  us.  To  ensure  a
thorough investigation, the research integrated several research methods: document
analysis,  focus  groups,  interviews  and  survey.  Analysis  of  internal  and  publicly
accessible documents provided the macro context of workers’ stratification. The study
of the internal documentation on work systemisation and collective agreements within
the  branch  of  a  particular  company  was  complemented  with  publicly  available
documents  and  published  data.15 The  triangulation  of  quantitative  and  qualitative
methods yielded a thorough insight into working relationships. A survey among the
population of workers was conducted in all three companies between November 2013
and February 2014. Out of a total of 1,285 employed workers, 827 10-minute-long paper
questionnaires were collected;  480 (80 per cent response rate)  from workers in the
paper company, 257 (59 per cent response rate) in the publishing company, and 90 (69
per cent) in the printing company.
9 To  investigate  the  management  and  trade  union  perspectives,  we  made  15  semi-
structured  interviews:  9  with  members  of  executive  boards  and  human  resources
representatives, 4 with trade union representatives, and 2 with representatives of the
work councils.16 Research outcomes of the quantitative and qualitative analysis were
further complemented through presentations and discussions within the three focus
groups in which employees from all company departments participated.17
10 The key contribution of this research is that it challenges the idea that trade unions
represent  the  labour  aristocracy.  Moreover,  building  on  the  recent  developments
stressed in our historical outlook, the analysis sheds light on possible tensions between
the strategy of trade unions and their members’ and supporters' expectations. While
this  research  is  limited  to  three  companies  and  is  unable  to  anticipate  further
developments, it adds to reflections on issues of global interest in the present period:
the growing precarisation of workers,  their relationship with trade unions,  and the
internal divisions among workers.
 
Social conflicts and Slovenian trade unions: A
historical overview
11 The secession of Slovenia from Yugoslavia in 1991 and the restoration of capitalism also
required the restructuring of trade unionism. While earlier sociological interpretations
pointed  out  the  exceptionality  of  Slovenia’s  resilience  against  neoliberal  trends
through social dialogue,18 recent ones draw attention to its weaknesses. 19 Combining
these interpretations with ours, we outline three phases of trade union responses to
changes in the labour/capital relationship since the end of socialism: 1. The tripartite
“social partnership” consolidated in the 1994-2004 phase that coincides with a decade
of rule by the centre-left Liberal Party after the defeat of Slovenia’s first (right-wing)
government and social mobilisations triggered by a “reformed” former official trade
union; 2. “Working-class” trade union militancy from 2005-2012 during a time of more
intensive labour/capital polarisation, crises and social upsurges; and 3. Trends towards
“economic unionism” or the “retreat” from representing the working class since 2013.
This section starts by offering some general remarks about trade unions in the socialist
past and then describes the outlined chronology while drawing upon the mentioned
and certain other studies.20 
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Trade unions, strikes and the Yugoslav self-management system
12 The trade union function of “defender” of workers’ interests was unclear in all regimes
where a communist  leading (single)  party and the workers’  state were supposed to
“represent” the interests of workers. The role of trade unions was not better defined on
the  “Yugoslav  road  to  socialism”  following  the  1948  break  with  the  statist  “Soviet
model”, characterised by the introduction of workers’ councils from 1950 and by an
extension  of  self-management  rights.21 In  the  self-management  system,  strikes
(although not  legal,  were recognised increasingly as  legitimate)  expressed the poor
functioning of the system: they were an instrument of last resort for workers to use to
defend their interests. Nada G. Novaković  compiled research findings of the leading
Yugoslav  sociologists Neca  Jovanov,  Josip  Županov,  Nebojša  Popov,  Lidija  Mohar,
Vladimir Arzenšek and many others from the 1960s to the 1980s.22 The study sheds light
on two time periods: up until  1980, there were many fewer strikes than during the
1980s; they involved fewer workers and were much shorter (most not exceeding 1 day);
and often achieved their goals, unlike what happened in the 1980s. As expressed in the
title of Novaković’s book, the change after 1980 reflects the sharp decline in workers’
strength in the last decade of the system’s open political and socio-economic crisis.
Having failed to resolve problems within the workers’ councils and the trade unions,
workers were forced to rely on wildcat strikes. Trade unions kept their distance from
these strikes, which were usually led by ad hoc strike groups. In contrast, trade unions
behaved  like  “firemen”;  they  became  engaged  in  strikes  to  end  them  quickly  and
peacefully.23 The trade unions only sporadically aligned themselves with the strikers. 
13 Yet,  as  the  study  stresses,  while  their  role  in  workers’  strikes  was  ambiguous,  the
unions held a significant social  function as a  provider of  foods,  holidays and social
activities  for  workers.  They  also  managed  the  allocation  of  apartments  owned  by
companies. Moreover, although industrial workers could not really enforce the self-
management  rights  assigned  to  them,  they  were  able  to  benefit  from  the
complementary  efficient  social  management  of  public  goods  (health,  education,
pension, social care, etc.), which provided them with a high “social income”. As Rastko
Močnik  stresses,  “the  social  management  in  public  services  developed  a  successful
pattern  of  democratic  regulation  of  non-commodified  production  and
social reproduction.”24 
14 Another ambiguity of the system stemmed from the status of managers. Because they
were considered wage workers, managers were also members of trade unions and even
prevailed  over  industrial  productive  workers  and  administrative  employees  as  the
more  active  members  of  trade  unions  during  socialism.  The  sociologist  Arzenšek
showed that the influence of management was seen in all fields, including investments,
the pace of work, working time, and wage distribution.25 Still, workers had the right to
choose  and dismiss  them,  which was  no longer  the  case  after  the  immediate  post-
socialist period. 
15 Since the break with the socialist system, the main form of democratisation has been
through political  pluralism – for  political  parties  and trade unions alike.  Voluntary
membership,  demands for  the right  to  strike,  and collective  bargaining triggered a
reform of Slovenian trade unions. Supporting the mine strikers in Kosovo and Istria at
the end of the 1980s, trade unions in Slovenia demanded that the Association of Trade
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Unions of Yugoslavia recognise the rights to strike and collective bargaining and, later
on, promoted these rights when they were involved in discussing amendments to the
Slovenian constitution in the late 1980s.26
 
Mobilisation of workers, trade union renewal and the social
partnership
16 The post-socialist trade union pluralism led to the founding of a new “conservative”
Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Slovenia (KNSS) as well as the “reform”
of an official trade union (i.e. Association of Trade Unions), renaming it the Association
of  Free  Trade  Unions  of  Slovenia  (ZSSS).  The  latter,  although initially  considerably
weakened by the departure of some members who set up new trade unions,27 managed
to keep a leading role in the renewal of the workers’ movement. 
17 Wages  and  privatisation  were  fundamental  points  of  conflict  facing  the  first
conservative  government  of  DEMOS  (Democratic  Opposition  of  Slovenia)  after  the
country’s independence in 1991. ZSSS resisted the plan for any rapid and generalised
privatisation. In September 1991, while Prime Minister Jože Peterle was presenting the
country’s privatisation plan that drew on the proposals of Jeffrey Sachs (an American
economist who played the role of adviser after having done so in Latin America), 10,000
workers marched in protest beneath his window. Later, a new law on privatisation was
presented  and  ratified  on  the  basis  of a  compromise  drafted  by  the  Slovenian
economist Jože Mencinger28 that envisioned a more gradual form of privatisation (than
Sachs’ recommendations). In March 1992, ZSSS organised a general strike on another
issue, this time against a draft law on wage restraint by which the government wanted
to keep inflation under control. The trade unions called for higher wages, collective
bargaining,  and job  protection.29 Although the  two other  confederations,  KNSS and
PERGAM, boycotted the strike, it involved up to 400,000 workers (for a total Slovenian
population of about 2 million inhabitants) and the government was forced to withdraw
the draft law.30
18 All of these actions led to the fall of the country’s first right-wing government in 1992.31
According to Miroslav Stanojević,  the power held by the trade unions resulted in a
strong “social partnership,” meaning that the labour force was genuinely involved in
elaborating systemic laws and was firmly committed to maintaining the welfare state.32
This was analysed as a “neocorporatist” structure which Guglielmo Meardi dubbed the
“Slovenian social model.”33 After the defeat of more right-wing projects, a tripartite
consultative  body  called  the  Economic  and  Social  Council  was  established  in  1994,
which embodied the “Slovenian social model” until 2004. It included representatives of
the government, employers’ organisations, and trade unions, and had a right to discuss
and give an opinion on draft legislation. In practice, no draft law in the areas of social,
economic  and  especially  labour  policy  could  enter  the  parliamentary  procedure
without having first been discussed in the council. Trade unions accepted the council’s
role as a “social partner” with a view to establishing a “social market economy”. The
trade unions’ strong social impact was reflected in a high trade union density rate (i.e.
the ratio of trade union members to the total number of wage earners in the economy).
This rate was between 60 and 70 per cent until 1994 and later stabilised at around 40
per cent until 2004.
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19 One goal of the Economic and Social Council was membership in the European Union
(EU). This goal was accomplished for Slovenia, along with eight other Eastern European
countries in 2004. In 2007, Slovenia also entered the European Monetary Union (EMU).
The trade unions thus became less resilient to the pressure of European negotiators
who  were  asking  for  wage  growth  restraint  and  greater  intensification  of  work:
moreover, they did not open up the question of wealth redistribution.34 Meanwhile, the
dominant  party  developed  a  way  of  privatisation  that  involved  corruption  and
clientelism, which was denounced by the right-wing parties (before they themselves
adopted similar practices upon coming to power). This led to the fall  of the Liberal
Party in 2004, the year Slovenia joined the EU.
 
2004-2013: The emergence of working-class unionism and the 
seeds of “retreat”
20 The  new  right-wing  government  led  by  Janez  Janša  (elected  in  2004)  introduced
neoliberal reforms in 2005. This generated a massive protest led by the trade unions.35
For  almost  a  decade,  trade unions  displayed a  new radicalism and,  simultaneously,
signs of indulgence that gave rise to the contradictory logics of concession-making.
21 Due  to  the  huge  mobilisation  in  2005,  the  government  was  forced  to  withdraw its
proposed flat-rate (and drastically reduced) tax, which was supposed to attract foreign
capital. Almost simultaneously, ZSSS hired young activists who opened up the trade
union agenda to include the rights of non-members, migrants and precarious workers.
These  efforts  met  with  a  great  response  among  the  population.  Despite  the  2009
recession, trade unions were able to win a 23 per cent minimum wage rise. In 2011, they
organised a massive popular mobilisation against the neoliberal pension and labour
reforms. Using the right to organise a popular referendum, they were able to defeat
both draft laws. Globally, by fighting against these neoliberal reforms and defending
the rights of the entire working population, including non-members and precarious
persons,  trade unions adopted a more offensive class  confrontation and re-founded
themselves on “class-based unionism.” 
22 In the meantime, other processes had already introduced the seeds of defeat into the
above strategies.36 After the big victory over the government in 2005, the trade unions
agreed to return to negotiations: in fact, they exchanged the withdrawal of one reform
(the flat-rate tax) for the government’s promise to “limit inflation”. For workers, this
meant more work for the same or lower wages.  On top of  this,  the unions did not
question  the  new  wave  of  privatisations  already  underway.  The  situation  became
worse.  In 2006,  employers were able to bring about the cancellation of  the general
collective agreement with the private sector, and the government made membership in
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry no longer compulsory, against the chamber’s
will. As a result, the coverage of collective bargaining shrank rapidly to reach 65 per
cent in 2013 (ICTWS database).37
23 Between 2006 and 2011, the union density rate oscillated around 30 per cent, but in
2012  it  dropped  to  about  20  per  cent.38 Together  with  the  general  de-unionisation
process,  the  tendency  towards  trade  unions  becoming  more  fragmented  was
reinforced.  As  noted,  besides  the  transformation  of  ZSSS,  four  trade  union
confederations were established immediately after the secession from Yugoslavia, with
their  number  later  rising  to  seven  confederations.  To  illustrate  the  level  of
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fragmentation, we can take the example of the public sector where negotiations with
the government even today still  involve about 40 representative trade unions. Such
fragmentation enabled the government to play the unions against each other,39 thereby
considerably weakening their power. 
24 The phase of growing polarisations came in the context of the international banking
and financial crisis of 2008, followed by the “debt crisis” in the EU after the bailing out
of banks and public interventions to slow the recession. This led to radical austerity
politics under the pressure of European and international financial institutions and a
new wave of social unrest.40 The Slovenian “winter of discontent” in late 2012 and early
2013 was  a  grass-roots  uprising against  austerity  measures.  It  started in  November
2012, with people being determined to continue their protests until the government
resigned. Under attack, the president of the right-wing government, Janez Janša, was
responsible for the spread of rumours in the international press about the disastrous
economic forecast for Slovenia, said to be on the edge of bankruptcy. Media reports
triggered a rise in the interest rate for public loans, provoking a real financial crisis.41
Popular  uprisings  resulted  in  a  vote  of  no  confidence  against  the  right-wing
government and its fall, yet the crisis was not over.
 
Since 2013: Towards “economic unionism”
25 The  new  (centrist)  government  found  itself  in  the  grip  of  both  the  European
Commission  and  the  European  Central  Bank  that  were  waving  the  spectre  of  the
country’s bankruptcy after the model of Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Cyprus.42
European  institutions  imposed  unprecedented  and  harsh  conditions  on  the
recapitalisation  of  Slovenian  banks,43 demanded  that  state-owned  companies  be
privatised, and sought to weaken the trade unions since they stood in the way of the
reforms. Trade unions were seriously affected in May 2013 when the parliament, under
the threat of an EU bailout, amended the Constitution to forbid the right to organise
popular referendums on all issues concerning fiscal matters, defence and international
regulations.44 This prohibition on referendums on these issues took away a powerful
tool from the trade unions for combatting anti-labour proposals. The labour reform in
2013 was probably the last ambitious project of the social partners with which the trade
unions tried to restrain precarisation. Though ambitious, the overall long-term effects
of  this  reform  have  brought  only  disappointing  results.  Since 2014,  the  economic
recovery has relied significantly on the employment of precarious workers.
26 Since 2013, trade unions have not been able to regain their past anti-systemic power.
However, a change in trade union strategy was explicitly formulated only in 2017 in the
inaugural speech of Lidija Jerkič, the newly elected president of the largest trade union
ZSSS. She introduced the slogan “back to the membership,”45 by which she appealed for
a switch from class-based unionism to “economic unionism.” Under the new strategy,
trade unions tend to serve the immediate interests of their members rather than the
general interests of all workers, including migrant and precarious workers. Moreover,
the high level of trade union fragmentation triggered strong competition among them
and a ruthless struggle for better deals, usually to the detriment of other unions. The
uneven wage increases obtained by trade unions in the public sector in December 2018
show the lack of solidarity among workers. Namely, the campaign for higher wages
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initially  revolved  around  workers  with  the  lowest  wages,  thereby  attracting
sympathies, yet ultimately this group of workers received the smallest wage increases.
27 This dual trend of worker stratification and a change in trade union strategy lies at the
core of the case study which we analyse below.
 
Greater stratification of workers
28 In our historical overview, we have outlined the evolution of labour/capital relations
and,  through  different  phases,  the  transformation  of  trade  union  strategy:  social
partnership,  class-based  unionism,  economic  unionism.  We  now  examine  the
stratification of workers and their relationship with the trade union relying on data
collected in our case study. 
29 We first present the three companies in which the research was carried out. We then
use  the  concepts  presented  in  the  introduction,  first  putting  emphasis  on  the
“technical composition” of the labour force.
30 The paper company held the reputation of a “trade-union fortress” at the time of the
research. It was and remains one of the biggest export companies in Slovenia. In the
1990s, the company had 2,000 employees; by way of natural attrition, the number of
employees has shrunk to 750. Running a deficit in the past has helped improve the
company’s profitability since 2013, mostly through reducing the number of employees,
the greater intensification of labour, and wage restrictions. During the research, the
company was on the government’s list of 15 state-owned enterprises to-be privatised. A
Czech Republic-based investment fund called Eco-Investment bought the company in
2016.
31 The printing company is a greenfield investment of a multinational firm, one of the
biggest in the European printing industry. Trade unions here are weaker than in the
other  two  companies:  less  than  half  the  employees  are  members  of  one  of  two
competing  trade  unions.  The  enterprise  is  strongly  export-oriented.  Although  a
medium-sized firm in terms of employee numbers (around 100 workers), it realises a
bigger  income  than  do  larger  Slovenian  printing  companies.  Among  the  three
companies,  it  is  the  only  one  to  have  been  growing  and  increasing  its  employee
numbers during the crisis.
32 The publishing company is an old publishing house that developed from a socialist
firm into a multinational with subsidiaries in nine South-East European countries. At
the time of the research, it had around 400 employees; the whole group about 1,000.
More than half the employees are members of two trade unions. In 2006, a financial
holding  (owned  by  the  Catholic  Church)  became  the  majority  owner,  but  it  went
bankrupt  in  2010  due  to  being  unable  to  pay  the  debts  it  incurred  for  leveraged
buyouts. In this situation, both the management and the employees took steps to cut
costs with a view to rescuing the enterprise.  The company also sold off most of its
foreign subsidiaries.  During the crisis,  the key partner of  the management was the
trade union. To date, the company is still unsold.
33 As our research was starting in 2013/2014, the economic downturn had reached an
extreme stage with record levels of bankruptcy and unemployment. In interviews, we
could feel the pressure on both management and workers who were struggling to keep
their factories alive and sought to cope with the anticipated restructuring, downsizing,
Workers' Struggles in Post-Socialist Slovenia: Between Trade Union Strategies...
Balkanologie, Vol. 15 n° 2 | 2020
9
relocation  and  privatisation  of  companies.  Among  the  three  sectors,  printing  and
publishing  were  particularly  affected  by  financial  speculation  in  this  period.  The
Catholic Church took over the publishing company in our study through a leveraged
buyout and, unable to repay its debts once the crisis erupted, put the company on sale
for  a  price  below  its  liquidation  value,  exposing  the  employees  to  yet  another
speculative  acquisition.46 The  printing  industry  also  suffered  numerous  takeovers,
mergers and buyouts that often led to the downsizing and bankruptcy of the companies
acquired. An established printing enterprise with 300 workers went bankrupt in 2009, 4
years  after  it  had been taken over.  The owner  pocketed all  of  the  company’s  cash
reserves by issuing false invoices and depositing the proceeds in tax havens.47 Several
months of wages and the severance pay of dismissed workers went unpaid. 
34 These two examples illustrate the destructive force of credit-driven economic growth.
They help to understand the uncertainty of workers when they are confronted by the
bearers of small and medium-sized capital. Such capital “carried out the 'dirty work' of
destroying  the  […]  traditional  relations  of  production  and  in  the  process  either
founder[ed] in ruins or prepare[d] the ground for the 'normal' production of surplus
value.”48 These  general  observations  were  reflected  in  the  survey  conducted  in  the
paper, printing and publishing companies with respect to how workers felt about their
job security and working conditions. 
35 In the survey, workers were asked to select the most adverse factors in their workplace.
They  were  asked  to  rate  eight  indicators  on  a  scale  from  1  to  5:  “fear  of  losing
employment,”  “poor  salary,”  “hard  work,”  “excessive  working  hours,”  “mobbing,”
“risk of occupational diseases and injuries,” “monotonous work” and “changes and re-
organisations.”  Two factors  –  “low pay”  and “fear  of  losing  employment”  –  by  far
received the highest scores as the factors most troubling for all employees. 
36 In the publishing company, the workers’ anxiety could be explained by the fact that a
prospective buyer was conducting due diligence during the time of the research. As for
the paper company, it was under the threat of the government’s decision to sell off
state-owned companies.  This  was  less  evident  in  the  printing  company,  which is  a
subsidiary of a multinational corporation where workers also scored “fear of losing
employment” as a high risk, even though this company’s performance was very good.
Our conversations with the trade union representatives and the manager helped us to
understand that these fears all  referred to the possibility of relocating the plant to
another country (with lower taxes and lower labour costs). The parent company was
using the idea of restructuring and relocating the plant as a means to exert constant
pressure on its workers. 
37 However, while all workers had to intensify their work and all wages were lowered or
stagnating, the effects were not equal across all worker groups. Our findings show that
the measures adopted in response to the crisis clearly affected the production workers
more harshly than they affected supervisors and management. 
38 First,  workers  did  not  all  have  the  same risk  of  losing  their  jobs.  Redundancies  in
companies  that  urgently  needed  to  cut  their  costs  during  the  crisis  were
disproportionately high among low-skilled workers. In the paper company, 33 per cent
of workers who had completed primary education or less were made redundant in the
period 2008-2013, while only 11 per cent of workers with a vocational education, 16 per
cent with a high school degree, and 6 per cent with a university degree were laid off. In
the publishing company, 26 per cent of employees with a lower education, including
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high school graduates (the average education level in this company was higher), lost
their jobs but only 11 per cent of employees with a higher education lost their jobs.
Therefore, high-skilled employees had greater job security than low-skilled workers.
39 Second, the low-skilled workers reported working conditions that were more difficult.
We  confirmed  the  correlations  between  “low  education  level”  and  “hard  work,”
“excessive  working hours,”  “monotonous  work,”  “risk  of  occupational  diseases  and
injuries,” “changes and re-organisations” in the paper company,49 and the correlations
with “risk of occupational diseases and injuries,” “changes and re-organisations,” “low
wage”  and  “hard  work”  in  the  publishing  company.50 The  intensification  of  work
apparently affects low-skilled workers more than their better-educated co-workers.
40 Third, all employees almost unanimously rated “low pay” as the most disturbing factor.
Wages  set  at  around  the  minimum  wage  facilitated  methods  for  the  extracting  of
surplus  value,  which  the  management  widely  relied  on  during  the  crisis.  While
analysing the data, we discovered the contradiction that the workers in the printing
company, where the average wage was 27 per cent above the average for the industry,
were as discontent with their wages as the workers in the paper company where the
average wage was 13 per cent below the industry average. Moreover, both were even
more dissatisfied than those working in the publishing company where the average
wage was 14 per cent below the industry average. 
41 During the interviews with trade unionists in the printing company, we found that the
management  regularly  makes  small  wage  increases  conditional  on  the  further
intensification of labour.51 In the past, workers could work overtime on weekends and
some, eager to earn extra money, had been accumulating record overtime hours until
the Labour Inspectorate made a check of the company and banned the practice. There
are other similar practices. Production workers receive a bonus of 0.75 per cent of pay
per hour  for  each  day  if  the  “machines  run  without  interruption.”52 Instead  of
scheduled breaks, workers take rest breaks during the working day only if and when
they can afford to, for which they receive about 10 per cent of their wage as a bonus.
Further, although two printers usually work with one machine, the company offers a
bonus of 50 per cent of basic salary per hour if the work is done by one person. And, the
company offers on-job training to unskilled workers to take on work that is typically
carried out by qualified printers. This is a kind of special reward for loyal and hard-
working persons, but after the completion of training, the company pays the worker
more than before, but less than it would pay a skilled worker. Workers know that all of
these bonuses are only temporary until they become accustomed to intensified work,
but are still forced to exchange more intensive work for the necessary (or desired) level
of income.53 As we can see, “extra” payment above the industry average consists of
bonuses and, for this reason, workers may feel deprived of reasonable pay.
42 As in the printing factory, the paper company has also resorted to various methods for
intensifying work. The company had been in the red some years before our research
and had been pushing its  workers to work harder with the fear of  bankruptcy and
unemployment  rather  than  with  monetary  incentives.  Between  2009  and  2012,  it
reduced  the  number  of  employees  by  15  per  cent  and,  although  no  significant
technological investments were made, the company succeeded to produce the same
output as before. Consequently, those who remain have had to take over the tasks of
the missing workers, as one trade union representative described, “After the departure
of workers, instead of eight, now only five work per shift [i.e. on one production line]
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and three workers were not replaced, but their work was reallocated to the others,
meaning  that  each  received  additional  tasks.”54 This  practically  means  that  while
before one worker worked with one machine, now one must work with two – and has to
work at high speed for all eight hours. In the final weeks of our research, the paper
company adopted the same policy as the printing factory that the machines must never
stop, not even for a break. Workers retained the right to a half-hour break during the
eight-hour  working day  as  the  labour  law requires,  but  they must  ensure  that  the
machines work constantly and take a break in the waiting time or when a replacement
worker is available. As workers explained in the focus group, the only possible solution,
if the machines are to operate continually, is the workers’ voluntary shortening of their
rest breaks.55 In this way, the management is eroding the legal right of workers to a
half-hour break: while workers still have the right de jure, they cannot exercise it de
facto.56
43 The working conditions are generally better in the publishing company, but even here
we find departments under extreme pressure with respect to the pace of work. Workers
in the call centres receive a minimum wage if they reach a set work norm. For any work
beyond that, they receive “nice” financial incentives.57 However, when most workers
manage to achieve the work norm, the company unilaterally raises it, so the workers
end up again toiling for the minimum wage.
44 Examples from all  three companies show that the workers enjoy different levels  of
employment, work and income security.58 Everywhere we find a tier of workers whose
poor working conditions and low income place them in a very tough situation. Wages
set at around the minimum wage59 do not provide for all of their basic needs, so they
must earn more and desperately want to do so. For this reason, they are easy targets of
demands for more work in exchange for small payments.60 As they earn wages that
place them at risk of poverty, they are subjected to “factory despotism,” (i.e. to the
permanent exchange of more work for small extra payments) much more than other
workers. The logic runs as follows: the additional efforts made by workers for extra
payments will  over time become the standard work norm, covered by the standard
wage, and the worker will then have to work even harder to gain any additional pay.
Consequently,  the  system  drives  them  to  exploitation  beyond  their  biological
capabilities, past the natural exhaustion of their bodies. From a legal point of view,
their employment is secure (fixed-term). The “security” of their employment certainly
makes a difference but, as workers often stated in the interviews, the legal protection
of  their  job  does  not  count  for  much in  a  very  unsteady economy.  In  many other
respects,  such as  income insecurity  and health hazards,  they are  precarious.  As  an
International Labour Organisation (ILO) report stresses, “precarity can be found also
within standard employments, if, for example, the wages are at the poverty level, if the
continuity of their job is uncertain, or if the job exposes the worker to occupational
hazards.”61
 
Political differentiation in the workplace
45 In the previous section, we established that workers are not equally affected by the risk
of losing their jobs,  the intensification of labour or wage restrictions.  The differing
situations  indicate  what  we have  labelled  the  “technical  composition of  the  labour
force” involves stratification; there is a very uneven evolution in working conditions
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and those at the bottom suffer the greatest deterioration. We now turn to the “political
composition”  of  the  labour  force  in  relation  to  its  stratification,  as  defined  in  the
introduction, by combining two approaches: the study first presents the demographic
characteristics of trade union members and then workers’ expectations of trade unions
in the three companies.
 
Demographic characteristics of trade union members
46 In the paper company, 91 per cent of the workers are trade union members, in the
publishing company 63 per cent are members, while in the printing company 49 per
cent of all workers are divided between two trade unions.
47 For  the  paper  company,  statistical  tests  confirmed  correlations  between  “age,”
“gender,” “education” and “trade union membership.” Older workers are more likely
to be trade union members than younger ones; there is a bigger share of women than
men in the trade union (95 per cent of women compared to 87 per cent of men);62 and
less educated workers are more likely to be trade union members than more educated
ones.63 More specifically about the latter: 69 per cent of those who hold a university
degree are unionised compared to 92 per cent of those who have completed secondary
or vocational school and to 98 per cent of those who have complete or partial primary
school education.
48 The survey of  the publishing company shows similar  results:  higher proportions of
older workers as well as female workers are likely to become trade union members.64
There is also a strong positive correlation between trade union membership and the
low educational background of employees: while only 48 per cent of those who have a
university  degree  are  union  members,  82  per  cent  of  those  with  a  lower  level  of
education are members of the trade union.65
49 The sample in the printing company was much smaller, allowing us to confirm only the
correlation with the variable “education,”66 evident in all three cases. As workers with
lower education are usually paid less, this implies that lower-paid employees prevail
among trade union members in all three companies. 
50 This confirms the finding, so far revealed only in public opinion polls,67 about the actual
dominance of workers with a lower income level among trade union members. More
importantly,  our  findings  speak  against  the  critical  view  that  trade  unions  are
organisations of the “labour aristocracy.” While debates over labour aristocracies and
the labouring poor are still significant in Slovenia (as elsewhere), our study raises some
doubt that Slovenian trade union membership consists of the “labour aristocracy”. The
three cases we considered rather connect trade union membership with the labouring
poor. Of course, it is important to note that the study only covers limited examples and
does not include examples from the public sector. However, it proves that we must be
careful  about  any references  to  a  “labour  aristocracy.”  We should not  confuse  two
analytical levels: the analysis of trade union membership (as analysed here) and the
political strategies of trade union leaders (as stressed in the first part).
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Workers’ views on trade union activities 
51 After presenting the demographic characteristics of trade union members, we examine
workers’  views  on  trade  unions.  Both  approaches  together  are  expected  to  yield
information about the “political composition of the labour force.” 
52 For this purpose, we asked respondents to rate their preferences about proposed trade
union activities on a 5-point scale. Taken together, all respondents held preferences for
five  trade  union  activities  –  “to  represent  workers  before  the  government  and
employers”  (average  score  of  4.5),  “wage  increases”  (4.43),  “legal  assistance”  (4.4),
“improvement of working conditions” (4.36), “solidarity aid” (4.26) – over apparently
four less important activities, namely “leisure activities (sports, outings, gatherings)”
(3.3), “education” (3.23), “holiday facilities” (3.133) and “food bank” (2.6). It is clear that
the respondents classified two groups of activities in two different groups of major and
minor  importance.  In  order  to  identify  the  main  dimensions  of  what  respondents
believe the labour union should be performing, principal component analysis (PCA) was
conducted on a set of variables measuring union activities. The PCA method reduces
the dimensions of the data by extracting the main components in the variables which
explain the greatest amount of the data dispersion. Based on the components gained,
different  clusters  of  respondents  were  identified.  Two  analyses  of  this  type  were
conducted,  namely  in  the  paper  and  publishing  company,  since  the  sample  in  the
printing company was too small.
53 The conducted PCA method of the respondents’ preferences for trade union activities
split the publishing company’s workers into two groups. The larger group (80 per cent
of respondents answering this question) varied from the smaller one (20 per cent of
respondents) with stronger support for trade union activities. As expected, a statistical
test  confirmed that  trade  union members  are  more  supportive  than non-members.
What  is  more interesting is  that  the  bulk  of  non-members  classified themselves  as
“supporters”: 67 per cent of non-members supported the trade unions’ activities.
54 The clustering of answers with the same method in the paper company based on the
same block of questions split the respondents into three groups. The smallest group (5
per cent of respondents answering this set of questions) is categorically opposed to all
trade  union  activities  (“non-supporters”),  while  the  second  group  (47  per  cent  of
respondents) supports all trade union activities (“supporters”) and the third group (48
per cent of respondents) only supports some activities (“restrained supporters”). Once
again, the group of “non-supporters” is the smallest, while non-members (less than 10
per cent of workers) support the trade unions. It is worth stressing that more educated
and  better-paid  workers  generally tend  to  support  unions,  but  are  less  willing  to
become members. The literature usually presents the issue of silent supporters who are
able to benefit from some trade union achievements without paying the price (i.e. the
membership fee)  as  the “free rider” problem.68 However,  this  explanation is  highly
improbable in our case regarding why only better-paid workers would prefer to rely on
a “free ride,” while their poorer counterparts are willing to pay. We now try to shed
light on the reasons that the upper tiers of company hierarchies usually abstain from
trade union membership by analysing their attitudes to various trade union activities.
55 We thus draw attention to the difference between the “supporters” and “restrained
supporters”  groups.  While  the  “supporters”  did  not  distinguish  the  trade  union
activities very much, the “restrained supporters” appreciated five activities but were
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extremely  reluctant  towards  others,  such  as  “holiday  facilities,”  “food  bank”  and
“leisure  activities.”69 In  contrast  to  the  “restrained  supporters,”  the  “supporters”
appreciate some commodities or services which the trade union offers at a lower price
and which they might possibly not be able to afford (holidays, food). They also attach
importance to trade union sports activities,  gatherings and events.  For the want of
things from food to leisure, they need trade union support mechanisms in order to
survive as well as to socialise. Therefore, in a way this makes this group supportive of
the  maintenance  of  a  “working  class  culture”  as  well  as  the  sharing  of  goods  and
beliefs.
56 In the publishing company, the PCA analysis showed only two groups, “supporters” and
“non-supporters.”  Nevertheless,  the  analysis  confirmed  the  statistical  significance
between “low education” and “food bank” as  well  as  between “low education” and
“holiday facilities.”70 This means that workers with a low education level (and therefore
lower incomes) hold a greater affinity for the food bank and holiday facilities than
higher-educated workers.
57 Their expectations contradict the current trade unions’ policy of making a break from
the “socialist past.” Trade union officers often link these activities (“holiday facilities,”
“food bank,” “leisure activities”) to the socialist past from which they have been trying
to distance themselves ever since the trade union reforms in the 1990s. For them the
expression “food bank” (ozimnica in Slovenian) symbolises all that should not inspire
contemporary trade unionism. It represents the “backwardness” of the socialist trade
unions and differs from a “real modern way” of doing trade unionism; namely, social
dialogue,  negotiations,  representation  and  legal  advocacy  (all  of  which  express
integration into a capitalist social relationship). The trade union officers’ own mind-set
thus gravitates more towards that of the “restrained supporters” (who prefer the more
distant role of the trade union as a negotiator, representative or lawyer, particularly in
the most recent phase of “economic unionism”) than “supporters” (who also appreciate
the integrative role of trade unions as a bearer of working-class culture). The research
lays  bare  the  contradiction  that  while  the  core  basis  of  trade  unions  consists  of
“supporters,”  actual  trade  union strategy  (including  economic  unionism)  gravitates
more to the preferred positions of “restrained supporters.” While comparing our case
study  and  the  evolution  of  trade  union  strategies,  we  can  say  that  by  distancing
themselves from the “supporters,” the trade unions are also loosening the ties with
their core membership.
58 Leaving aside the tiny group of “non-supporters” in the paper factory, both analyses
isolated  two  different  groups  holding  dissimilar  views  on  trade  unions.  While  all
workers generally support trade unions in the publishing and the paper companies,
those with a lower education and lower wages also tend to associate trade unions with
a  distinctive  “class  culture”  concerning  access  to  services  and  fundamental  goods
(therefore rights and “dignity”). The second group, consisting of workers who are paid
better  and  have  higher  education  levels,  is  less  likely  to support  this  “class-based
culture”  or  to  become  trade  union  members.  This  group  does  not  abstain  from
membership only to get a “free ride.” The second group may support trade unions
because any improvements attained in the collective negotiations are to their benefit
too. However, improvements in wages and working conditions for workers found at the
bottom of hierarchy might not be in their interest. Such improvements would, in the
present system, make the company less “competitive” and lead to job losses and lower
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income security for all workers. A free ride is hence a wrong way to view the problem.
The second group depends existentially on a growing exploitation of the lower tiers of
production  and  service  workers.  Thus  it  is  not  the  cost  of  the  ride  but  the
incompatibility of interests that keeps this group out of trade union membership.
59 The incompatibility  of  perceptions indicates  specific  workplace struggles.  The word
“struggle” here refers to the conflict involving “social representations” that should,
according  to  Durkheim,  be  treated  as  social  facts.  More  importantly,  the  word
“struggle” refers to the basic contradiction between the capitalist and working classes,
established in the very act of subordinating workers to capital and appropriating the
surplus value they produce. This is the very moment when the class struggle comes
into play, while industrial conflicts are consequences of this fundamental contradiction
(the passage from a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself). What we add to the notion of
struggle is  that we must observe “workplace struggles” in their dual  complexity as
struggles  between labour  and capital  as  well  as  struggles  within  the  working  class
(among various worker groups). 
60 The  research  also  shows  that  this  complexity  of  workplace  struggles  demands  a
theoretical re-thinking of the current system of “co-exploitation” whereby workers at
the bottom of the hierarchy are co-exploited by their waged “superiors” and higher
levels of “capitalist” management. On the practical trade union level, this theoretical




61 In the first section, we established that while labour/capital antagonism has deepened,
trade unions have lost their strength through a long process of fragmentation. This
historical overview shows that trade unions have turned their back on representing the
working class. After 2004, they were confronted with harsher external pressures from
European and global capital institutions. Defeated, they started to compete with each
other in order to obtain better deals for their members. The propensity to defend the
“general interests of the working class” – inherited from the country’s socialist past
and  based  on  mass  mobilisation  which  helped  develop  the  Slovenian  model  of
industrial relations in the early 1990s – has gradually disappeared from trade unions’
practices. The strategies of trade unions are converging increasingly with the interests
of groups that possess considerable bargaining power.
62 Historical  analysis  that  looks  at  the  re-positioning  of  trade  unions  within  labour/
capital relations might have us believe that trade unions mostly represent upper-layer
workers (i.e. the “labour aristocracy”). Yet, our case study produces quite a different
picture.  The  analysis  of  trade  union  membership  in  three  companies  showed  that
workers with a lower education and lower wages were more likely to be trade union
members  than  were  their  more  educated  and  better-paid  colleagues.  Indeed,  the
analysis revealed that workers who possess the worst working conditions overlap with
trade union membership. We also underlined that their working situations are akin to
today’s particularly questioned status of a precarious worker. Therefore, contrary to
the  general  conviction  that  trade  unions  represent  better-off  employees  with
guaranteed employment, we found that the membership structure analysed in our case
study reflected both working poverty and rising precarity. 
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63 Moreover,  the  analysis  also  showed  that  the  trade  union  strategies  were  not
transformed to reflect a change in their membership structure, but to loosen their ties
with their core membership and social basis. We argue that this radicalisation of the
labour/capital  contradiction  corresponds  with  discordances  in  the  trade  union/
membership relationship, and that the deadlock in dialogue between labour and capital
is  leading  to  growing  tensions  in  the  workplace.  However,  we  can  also  see  the
connection between the two relationships (labour/capital relations on one side and the
trade union/membership relations on the other) the other way around. By pursuing
the immediate interests of better-off trade union members, trade unionism is simply
reflecting the increasing fragmentation of the workforce. Ironically speaking, these two
relations have established some kind of “new balance,” with the fragmentation of trade
unions reinforcing the rising inequalities among workers.
64 Our research showed that the efforts of management and the trade unions to keep the
companies afloat during the crisis and to save jobs had different impacts on various
worker groups. The intensification of labour and wage restrictions placed a heavier
burden on low-paid manual workers (direct producers) than on other strata of workers.
This situation generates the contradictory process where all employees benefit from
the greater exploitation of certain production and service workers. This contradiction,
in  turn,  raises  debates  about  the  “co-exploiting”  of  workers  and  calls  for  further
scientific  research  about  the  divisions  among  wage  workers  mentioned  in  the
introduction.
65 With regard to future research, we stress that our research does not support the view
that the growing inequalities seen among workers are the result of a bipolar model
with  management  or  bureaucracy  on one side  and workers  on the  other.  From an
organisational point of view, the three companies we analysed possess a simple vertical
structure.  If  we had conducted a  similar  analysis  in companies  with more complex
modular or supply chain production, we would likely have discovered a chain structure
in which all worker groups could receive some incentives to exploit others (while being
themselves exploited at the same time), except for those found at the bottom of the
hierarchy.
NOTES
1. BOHLE Dorothee, GRESKOVITS Béla, Capitalist Diversity on Europe’s Periphery, Ithaca and London,
Cornell University Press, 2012.
2. Ibid., p. 213.
3. BACCARO Lucio,  H OWELL Chris,  “A  Common  Neoliberal  Trajectory:  The  Transformation  of
Industrial Relations in Advanced Capitalism,” Politics & Society, vol. 39, no 4, 2011, p. 521-563.
4. T ERRAY Emmanuel,  “Prolétaire,  salarié,  travailleur  productif,”  Contradictions,  no 2,  July-
December  1972.  Quoted  in  BAUDELOT Christian,  E STABLET Roger,  M ALEMORT Jacques,  La  petite
bourgeoisie en France, Paris, François Maspero, 1981, p. 17.
Workers' Struggles in Post-Socialist Slovenia: Between Trade Union Strategies...
Balkanologie, Vol. 15 n° 2 | 2020
17
5. HOBSBAWM Eric, Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour, London, Weidenfeld Goldbacks,
1964. HOBSBAWM Eric, Worlds of Labour: Further Studies in Labour History, London, Weidenfeld and
Nicolson, 1984.
6. Ibid. 
7. POULANTZAS Nicos, Classes in Contemporary Capitalism,  London, NLB, 1975. Yet,  for him, some
productive workers also form a segment of the petty bourgeoisie, for instance, engineers and
technicians who participate in production but also “maintain political and ideological relations
of subordination of the working class to capital (p. 242).” 
8. BAUDELOT Christian, ESTABLET Roger, MALEMORT Jacques, La petite bourgeoisie en France, op. cit. 
9. DUMÉNIL Gérard, LÉVY Dominique, Managerial Capitalism: Ownership, Management and the Coming
New Mode of Production, London, Pluto Press, 2018.
10. Cf. BAUDELOT Christian, ESTABLET Roger, MALEMORT Jacques, La petite bourgeoisie en France, op. cit.
11. For an explanation of the two concepts, see NEGRI Antonio, Dall’operaio massa all’operaio sociale,
Ombre corte, Verona, 2007 [1979], for further elaboration, see MOČNIK Rastko, “Trg delovne sile in
sestava delavskega razreda” [The Labour Market and Composition of the Working Class], Teorija
in praksa, vol. 48, no 1, 2011, p. 178-205. Maria Turchetto gives the following definition: “‘Class
composition’ was intended to express the bond between the objective technical characteristics
evinced by labour-power at  a  given historical  moment,  as  a  result  of  its  position within the
capitalist organisation of the production process, and its subjective, political characteristics (p.
288).” TURCHETTO Maria “From ‘Mass Worker’ to ‘Empire’: The Disconcerting Trajectory of Italian
Operaismo,”  in  Jacques  Bidet,  Stathis  Kouvelakis  (eds.),  Critical  Companion  to  Contemporary
Marxism, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2008, p. 285-308.
12. Italian Operaisti considered the unskilled (“mass”) workers as the bearers of revolutionary
subjectivity, resisting the compromised labour organisations (the so-called yellow unions) as well
as factory despotism. 
13. The anonymisation of companies in the research outputs was requested by the management
as a precondition for conducting the research due to concerns over the impact of potentially
unfavourable research outcomes on the company leadership. A concern with negative publicity
was  present  among  the  trade  union  leadership  while  the  leaders  also  feared  that  public
disclosure of the research results on the (low) wages received by trade union members would
deter workers who wished to earn higher wages from becoming members of the trade union.
Therefore, the researchers had to agree to not disclose certain data.
14. The company was privatised in 2016.
15. These documents were found in the companies’ annual reports submitted to AJPES (Agency of
the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal Records and Related Services), articles in the journals of
professional  associations  (e.g.  Papir,  Grafičar,  Knjižnica), reports  of  international  organisations
within  the  branch  (CEPI,  Intergraf,  Federation  of  European  Publishers)  and  statistical  data
provided by AJPES, SURS (Republic of Slovenia Statistical Office) and Eurostat.
16. The average length of an interview was 65 minutes.
17. The average length of a focus group was 121 minutes.
18. BOHLE Dorothee,  G RESKOVITS Béla,  Capitalist  Diversity  on  Europe’s  Periphery,  op.  cit.;  CROWLEY
Stephen, STANOJEVIĆ Miroslav, “Varieties of Capitalism, Power Resources, and Historical Legacies:
Explaining the Slovenian Exception,”  Politics  &  Society,  vol.  39,  no 2,  2011,  p.  268-295;  M EARDI
Guglielmo,  “More  Voice  after  More  Exit?  Unstable  Industrial  Relations  in  Central  Eastern
Europe,” Industrial Relations Journal, vol. 38, no 6, 2007, p. 503-523.
19. STANOJEVIĆ Miroslav , “Slovenia:  Neo-Corporatism  under  the  Neo-Liberal  Turn,”  Employee
Relations,  vol.  40,  no 4,  2018,  p.  709-724;  K RAŠOVEC Alenka,  J OHANNSEN Lars,  “Social  Dialogue
between Transition and the Great Recession,” Teorija in praksa,  vol. 54 (Special Issue), 2017, p.
Workers' Struggles in Post-Socialist Slovenia: Between Trade Union Strategies...
Balkanologie, Vol. 15 n° 2 | 2020
18
30-44; BEMBIČ Branko, “From Victory to Victory to the Final Retreat: Changing Balance of Class
Forces in the Slovenian Transition,” Tiempo Devorado, vol. 4, no 2, 2017, p. 363-398.
20. STANOJEVIĆ Miroslav, “Sindikalne strategije v obdobju krize” [Trade Union Strategies at a Time
of Crisis], Teorija in praksa, vol. 52, no 3, 2015, p. 394-416). The three trade union strategies are
elaborated  in:  HYMAN Richard,  Understanding  European  Trade  Unionism,  Between  Market,  Class  &
Society, London, Sage, 2001.
21. SAMARY Catherine, Le marché contre l'autogestion: L'expérience Yougoslave, Paris, Publisud – La
Brêche, 1988; SAMARY Catherine, Komunizem v gibanju [Communism in Motion], Ljubljana, Založba
/*cf, 2017; KRŽAN Marko, “Jugoslovansko samoupravljanje in prihodnost socializma” [Yugoslav
Self-Management and the Future of Socialism], in Catherine Samary, Komunizem v gibanju), op. cit.,
p. 213-242.
22. NOVAKOVIĆ Nada G., Propadanje radničke klase [Decline of the Working Class], Belgrade, Rad,
2007.
23. Ibid., p. 124. 
24. Cf. M OČNIK Rastko,  “Workers'  Self-Management  in  Yugoslavia  –  Possible  Lessons  for  the
Present,”  in  website  of  Ozren  Džigurski,  n.d.,  online:  http://ozrendzigurski.com/index_files/
Page1305.htm (accessed in June 2020).
25. ARZENŠEK Vladimir,  Strukture  i  pokreti [Structures  and  Movements],  Belgrade,  Centar  za
filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, 1984.
26. Vrhovec  Pavle,  PERNAT L ESJAK Staša,  Sindikalno  gibanje  skozi  čas [Trade  Union  Movement
through Time], Ljubljana, in website of Association of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia, May 2015,
online:  http://sindeks.si/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/sindikalno_gibanje_skozi_cas.pdf
(accessed in June 2020).
27. In the early 1990s, the following trade unions split from ZSSS: Confederation PERGAM in the
paper and graphics sector,  Confederation KS-90 in the Littoral  region;  Teachers’  trade union
SVIZ, Trade Union of Health and Social Care, and Trade Union of Railway Workers.  See also,
VRHOVEC Pavle, PERNAT LESJAK Staša, Sindikalno gibanje skozi čas, op. cit., p. 21.
28. The law was adopted in November 1992. Cf. MENCINGER Jože, “Privatization in Slovenia,” in
website  of the  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Ljubljana,  n.d.,  online:  http://www.pf.uni-lj.si/
media/mencinger.privatization.pdf (accessed in June 2020).
29. “25  let  od  prve  splošne  stavke  v  Sloveniji”  [25  Years  since  the  First  General  Strike  in
Slovenia],  in  MMC  RTVSLO,  15  March  2017,  online:  https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/25-let-od-
prve-splosne-stavke-v-sloveniji/417376 (accessed in June 2020).
30. GRDEŠIĆ Marko, “Tranzicija, sindikati i politike elite u Sloveniji i Hrvatskoj” [Transition, Trade
Unions and Political Elites in Slovenia and Croatia], Politika misao, vol. 43, no 4, 2006, p. 121-141;
GRDEŠIĆ Marko, “Mapping the Paths of the Yugoslav Model: Labour Strength and Weakness in
Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia,” European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 14, no 2, 2008, p. 133-151.
31. A new left-centrist government was led by Janez Drnovšek, former chairman of the Collective
Presidency of Yugoslavia in 1989-1990, then leader of the Liberal Democratic Party which was a
legal successor of the Association of Socialist Youth of Slovenia.
32. STANOJEVIĆ Miroslav, BRODER Živa, “Trade Unions in Slovenia: Historical Development and the
Current Situation,” SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, vol. 15, no 3, 2012, p.
303-313.
33. MEARDI Guglielmo,  “More Voice after  More Exit?  Unstable  Industrial  Relations in  Central
Eastern Europe,” Industrial Relations Journal, vol. 38, no 6, 2007, p. 503-523; CROUCHER Richard, RIZOV
Marian, “Union Influence in Post-Socialist Europe,” Industrial Labour Relations Review, vol. 65, no 3,
2012, p. 630-650; GLASSNER Vera, “Central and Eastern European Industrial Relations in the Crisis:
National Divergence and Path-Dependent Change,” Transfer, vol. 19, no 2, 2013, p. 155-169.
34. STANOJEVIĆ Miroslav, “Sindikalne strategije v obdobju krize,” op. cit., p. 407-408.
Workers' Struggles in Post-Socialist Slovenia: Between Trade Union Strategies...
Balkanologie, Vol. 15 n° 2 | 2020
19
35. “Fotozgodba: Protest sindikatov” [Photostory:  The Trade Union Protest],  MMC RTVSLO,  26
November  2005,  online:  https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/fotozgodba-protest-sindikatov/46542
(accessed in June 2020).
36. STANOJEVIĆ Miroslav, “Sindikalne strategije v obdobju krize,” op. cit., p. 409.
37. VISSER Jelle, “ICTWSS Database,” Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labour Studies (AIAS),
University of Amsterdam, November 2019, online: https://www.ictwss.org/downloads (accessed
in November 2020).
38. BRODER Živa, Sindikalno gibanje v Sloveniji od osamosvojitve do danes [Labour Unions in Slovenia
from  Independence  till  Today], Master’s  Thesis,  Faculty  of  Social  Sciences,  University  of
Ljubljana, 2015, p. 41. The biggest trade union ZSSS, for instance, had 64 per cent of all trade
union members in 1991, while by 2015 it had only 40 per cent. 
39. Ibid., p. 42.
40. STANOJEVIĆ Miroslav,  KANJUO-MRČELA Aleksandra, BREZNIK Maja,  “Slovenia at the Crossroads:
Increasing  dependence  on  supranational  institutions  and  the  weakening  of  social  dialogue,”
European Journal of Industrial Relations, vol. 22, no 3, 2016, p. 281-294.
41. DAMIJAN Jože P., “Je mar Janez Janša neprišteven?” [Is Janez Janša insane?], Damijan Blog, 3
September  2012,  online:  https://damijan.org/2012/09/03/je-mar-janez-jansa-nepristeven/
(accessed in June 2020). 
42. For  a  more  detailed  account  of  the  crisis,  see:  SAMARY Catherine,  “Quelle  réelle  crise  en
Slovénie?,” in website of Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt, 2013, online: http://
www.cadtm.org/Quelle-reelle-crise-en-Slovenie (accessed  in  June  2020);  B REZNIK Maja,  F URLAN
Sašo, “Kje je Slovenija v dolžniški krizi?” [Where is Slovenia in the Debt Crisis?], in Maja Breznik,
Rastko Močnik (eds.), Javni dolg. Kdo komu dolguje? [Public Debt. Who Owes Whom?], Ljubljana,
Založba /*cf, 2015; KRŽAN Marko, “Crisis in Slovenia: Roots, Effects, Prospects,” METU Studies in
Development,  vol.  41,  no 3,  2014, p.  323-348;  P ODVRŠIČ Ana,  “Evroobmočje  in  periferizacija
slovenskega gospodarstva” [Eurozone and the Peripheralization of the Slovenian Economy], in
Miroslav Stanojević, Sašo Furlan (eds.), (Ne)dostojno delo [(In)decent work], Ljubljana, FDV, 2018, p.
27-51. 
43. In spring 2019, the criminal police concluded a long investigation into the recapitalisation of
Slovenian banks in 2013. It charged the governor and vice-governors of the Bank of Slovenia with
criminal acts. The investigation found that the European Commission’s officials imposed on the
Bank  of  Slovenia  a  methodology  for  calculating  the  bank  deficit  that  was  inconsistent  with
international accounting standards. Although international firms Oliver Wyman, Roland Berger,
Deloitte, and Ernst & Young officially signed off on the audit,  the investigation revealed that
European officials themselves decided about the (presumed) bank deficit. For this reason, the
deficit was expanded from EUR 375 million, as established by the Slovenian audit in the first
place,  to  EUR 4.7  billion.  In  response  to  the  investigation,  the  European Commission filed  a
lawsuit against Slovenia with the charge of “breaking the secrecy of the European Central Bank’s
archive.” The investigation report was presented by the journalist Borut Mekina in two articles:
“Štirje  tipi  o  milijardah”  [Four  Guys  about  Billions],  Mladina,  3  May  2019;  and  “Kdaj  bomo
spregledali?” [When Will we Realise?], Mladina, 10 May 2019.
44. Constitutional Act Amending Articles 90, 97 and 99 of the Constitution of the Republic of
Slovenia (UZ90, 97, 99), Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, no 47/13 of 31 May 2013.
45. “Nova predsednica ZSSS-ja Lidija Jerkič: Čas je, da delavci zahtevajo več” [New President of
ZSSS Lidija Jerkič: It Is Time for Workers to Demand More], MMC RTVSLO, 4 October 2017, online:
https://www.rtvslo.si/slovenija/nova-predsednica-zsss-ja-lidija-jerkic-cas-je-da-delavci-
zahtevajo-vec/434247 (accessed in June 2020).
46. BREZNIK Maja,  Za  napisom  Nezaposlenim  vstop  prepovedan  [Behind the  Notice  No  Admission
Except for Business], Ljubljana, KSS Pergam, 2014, p. 30-31.
Workers' Struggles in Post-Socialist Slovenia: Between Trade Union Strategies...
Balkanologie, Vol. 15 n° 2 | 2020
20
47. FRIŠEK Božo, “Adijo, tovarna. To je le moja zgodba – ena od mnogih” [Goodbye, Factory. This Is
just  my Story  –  One  of  Many],  Delo,  13  November  2013,  online:  https://www.delo.si/adijo-
tovarna/adijo-tovarna-to-je-le-moja-zgodba-ena-od-mnogih.html (accessed in June 2020).
48. MANDEL Ernest, Late Capitalism, London, Verso, 1978, p. 48.
49. With  statistical  significances  .000,  .004,  .007,  .008  and  .045  for  the  chi-square  test,
respectively.
50. With statistical significances .000, .000, .000 and .003, respectively. Due to the small number
of respondents, we could not conduct such tests in the printing company. However, descriptive
statistics suggest similar conclusions for this case too.
51. Interviews  with  two trade  union representatives  (6  and 23  December  2013)  as  well  as  a
manager (6 December 2013) from the printing company.
52. Data from an interview with a manager from the printing company (6 December 2013).
53. For  similar  findings,  see:  PHILIP Bruce,  W HEATLEY Dan,  “European Work  Time Regulation,
Surplus-Value and Underemployment among Full-Time Employees:  A Cross-Sectional Analysis
using the 2009 EU LFS,” Economic lssues, vol. 18, no 1, 2013, p. 57-74, p. 71.
54. Interview with a trade union representative from the paper company, 22 January 2014.
55. Data from the focus group with workers from the paper company, 24 June 2014.
56. Note that workers cannot renounce taking a break as “a worker who works full-time shall
have  the  right  to  a  30-minute  break  during  the  working  day”  (Article  154,  Employment
Relationship Act). EU directive (2003/88/EC) requires a rest break after six hours of work.
57. Data from the focus group with workers from the publishing company, 3 and 6 June 2014.
58. Employment  security means  protection  against  arbitrary  dismissal,  w ork  security  means
protection against accidents and illness at work, and income security means the assurance of an
adequate stable income (BONNET Florence, FIGUEREDO José B., STANDING Guy, “A Family of Decent
Work Indexes,” International Labour Review, vol. 142, no 2, 2003, p. 213-238.).
59. It is worth stressing that the calculation of the Slovenian minimum wage is calibrated on the
spending level of the country’s poorest 20 per cent of households and, for this reason, does not
establish a reliable absolute subsistence level. For the whole period since the crisis, the minimum
wage has been set at a level that exposes recipients of the minimum wage to the risk of poverty.
60. This is also a very destructive force to solidarity among workers. Minimum-wage workers are
forced to collaborate in breaking the legal, moral and solidarity principles that, in theory, protect
them from exploitation.
61. INTERNATIONAL L ABOUR O RGANISATION (ILO),  Non-Standard  Employment  around  the  World:
Understanding Challenges, Shaping Prospects, Geneva: ILO, 2016, p. 18.
62. The ratio of female workers was at 47 per cent in the paper factory.
63. Statistical significance for “age” is .001. More than 90 per cent of employees aged 41 years or
older are trade union members in comparison to 77 per cent of workers aged between 31 and 40
and 55 per cent of workers between 21 and 30 years. Statistical significance for “sex” is .001 (one-
sided) and statistical significance for “education” is .000.
64. Statistical  significances are .014 and .031,  respectively.  More specifically,  the trade union
covers 67 per cent of female workers compared to 51 per cent of males.
65. Statistical significance is .000.
66. Fisher's Exact Test one-sided statistical significance is .020.
67. Analysing, for instance, the European Social Survey in TURNER Thomas, D’ART Daryl, “Public
Perceptions of  Trade Unions in Countries  of  the European Union:  A Causal  Analysis,”  Labour
Studies Journal, vol. 37, no 1, 2012, p. 33-55, p. 50.
68. FREEMAN Richard B., ROGERS Joel, What Workers Want, Ithaca, ILR Press, 2006; FREEMAN Richard
B.,  BOXALL Peter,  H AYNES Peter  (eds.),  What  Workers  Say:  Employee  Voice  in  the  Anglo-American
Workplace, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2007; TURNER Thomas, D’ART Daryl, op. cit., p. 47-50.
Workers' Struggles in Post-Socialist Slovenia: Between Trade Union Strategies...
Balkanologie, Vol. 15 n° 2 | 2020
21
69. Additional factor analysis confirmed this interpretation. It showed two factors: the first was
positively related to “improvement of working conditions,” “solidarity aid,” “legal assistance,”
and “wage  increases,”  while  the  second factor  was  negatively  related  to  “leisure  activities,”
“holiday facilities” and “food bank.” The first factor explained 39 per cent of the variance on
measured variables, while the other factor 16 per cent. Together, they explained 55 per cent of
the overall variability.
70. Statistical significances are .000 and .001, respectively.
ABSTRACTS
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membership and activities. The analysis helps us approach the contradictory situation found in
the three companies in which all employees benefit from considerable exploitation of certain
groups  of  production  and  service  workers.  Our  research  may  be  seen  as  a  contribution  to
discussions and further research on the stratification of workers in a neoliberal context and on
the challenges facing trade unions in the setting of growing poverty and precarity.
L'article examine les liens entre l'évolution des relations travail/capital et syndicats/membres
dans  la  Slovénie  post-socialiste.  La  recherche  a  été  menée  dans  trois  entreprises  slovènes
pendant les années de récession 2013-2014.  L’analyse s'appuie sur le  concept de composition
« technique » et « politique » de la main-d’œuvre, développé par l’opéraïsme italien. L'objectif est
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